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NOTES

MISCONDUCT OF JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS DURING TRIAL:
INFORMAL SANCTIONS
An attorney has a duty and an obligation as a member of the bar to
conform to the standards of conduct prescribed by the legal profession.' The sanctions which may be applied to punish improper professional conduct cover a broad spectrum. At one extreme, an offending
attorney faces possible disbarment. Less serious offenses may result in
suspension or in a formal reprimand. Likewise, those members of the
profession who have been elevated to the bench must conduct themselves properly or risk removal by impeachment. Fortunately, resort
to such extreme penalties is seldom necessary. However, the everyday
strife of the legal world inevitably results in improper conduct which,
although not requiring the severity of formal discipline, should not go
unrebuked. Much of this improper conduct may understandably be
attributed to the tension and passions of the trial courtroom. This Note
will endeavor to examine that misconduct of both attorneys and judges
sanctions availwhich arises in the courtroom and the various informal
2
able to the courts with which to meet those offenses.
I. ATToRNEys

A. Conduct
The standards of proper conduct for attorneys are prescribed by the
Canons of Professional Ethics and by the usages, customs, and practices of the bar.3 The lawyer owes a duty and an obligation not only
to his client, but to the court, 4 opposing litigants and counsel, witnesses,
' See Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463, 473, 163 Pac. 237, 241 (3d

Dist. 1917) (dictum):
The members of the legal profession should, above all other members
of society, be the first to uphold the dignity of judicial tribunals ....
Indeed, such is among the first and most important of the obligations
to which the lawyer under his oath solemnly subscribes when he is
granted the right to practice his profession ....
2Formal sanctions for professional and judicial misconduct are not within the
ambit of this Note and will not be discussed further. For discussion of these
sanctions, see Miller, The Discipline of Judges, 50 McH. L. REV. 737 (1952) (impeachment of judges); Note, Disbarment:Misconduct and Defenses, 49 IoWA L. REv.
516 (1964) (this Symposium) (disbarment of attorneys-conduct); Note, Disbarment
Procedure,47 IowA L. REv. 984 (1962) (same-procedure). See also Vestal, The
Pretrial Conference and the Recalcitrant Attorney: A Study in Judicial Power,
48 IoWA L. Rsv. 761 (1963); Note, ExtrajudicialActivities of Judges, 47 IoWA L. REV.
1026 (1962).
3 See Professional Canon 25, A.BA. CANONS OF PROFESSiONAL ma Ju xcIAL ETHrcs
18 (1957) (known customs or practice of the bar should not be ignored) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. CANoNs]; DamTKE, LEGAL ETrcs 22 (1953). Drinker suggests
that statutes and the common law are additional sources of the standards. A
number of states have adopted the American Bar Association Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics in whole or in part. See, e.g., IowA Sup. CT. R. 119
(adopted except insofar as Professional Canon 27 conflicts with Iowa Code); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54-48 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE AxN. § 2.48.230 (1961).
4 See People v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 533, 574, 27 N.E. 1096, 1103 (1891):
The lawyer's duty is of a double character. He owes to his client the
duty of fidelity, but he also owes the duty of good faith and honorable
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and the jury as well. Nowhere is the proper exercise of this duty
more evident, and more important,5 than in his deportment in the trial
courtroom.
Foremost, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the court. 6 Decisions of the judge must be obeyed. When
a ruling has been finally made, the lawyer must, for the time being,
accept it and invoke his only proper remedy, appeal to a higher
court.7

The lawyer should also be punctual in attendance, and be

concise and direct in the trial and disposition of causes.8 His conduct
before the court and with other attorneys should be characterized
by candor and fairness. He should be courteous at all times. 10 All
personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided as such
colloquies only cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling.' Likewise, it is indecorous to allude to the personal history or the personal
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel.' 2 Adverse witdealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he practices his profession.
He is an officer of the court-a minister in the temple of justice.
5 In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential
that the system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a
high point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration.
The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless
the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such
as to merit the approval of all just men. Preamble, Canons of Professional
Ethics, A.B.A. CANows 1.
Perhaps no facet of judicial life is more influential in stimulating that essential
confidence in our courts than the impression created by the courtroom. Participation in the trial of a lawsuit, not just as a litigant but as a witness or juror
as well, is a dramatic experience for most laymen. However, in large part, it is
from this brief personal glimpse of our judicial system that public opinion is
shaped. And this opinion, whether favorable or unfavorable, is primarily the
result of the impression created by the conduct of those officers of the court,
the judge and the lawyers, upon whom is focused the attention of so many
strange and unsophisticated eyes. A trial conducted with efficiency and impartiality, with mutual respect and courtesy between bench and bar, and with
an aura of dignity, cannot fail to generate that essential public confidence in
the integrity of the courts. On the other hand, when discipline and decorum
fall below expected standards, that essential confidence and approval are in
jeopardy.
0
See Professional Canon 1, A.B.. CANONS 1.
7
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947).
8 See Professional Canon 21, A.B.A. CAmoNs 15.
0 See Professional Canon 22, A.B.A. CANONS 15-16. Canon 22 lists many acts
which are not candid or fair: knowingly misquoting the contents of a paper, a
witness' testimony, the language or argument of opposing counsel, or the
language of a decision or a textbook; citing as authority a decision that has
been overruled or a statute that has been repealed with knowledge of the invalidity; asserting in argument a fact which has not been proved.
10 See DRiNx, LEaAL ETmcs 22 (1953).
11 See Professional Canon 17, A.B.A. C,NoNs 14.
12 Ibid.
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nesses and suitors should also be treated with fairness and due consideration, and the lawyer should never minister to the malevolence
or prejudice of a client.'8 Finally, counsel must maintain an impersonal
attitude toward the jury 4 and should never assert his personal belief
in the justice of a client's cause.' 5
However, misconduct must be examined to some extent in a practical
light. In the pressure and tension of trial, attorneys are not always
required to adhere to the niceties of manner or choice of phrase to be
expected under other circumstances. Conduct which, if separated from
the whole context of trial and viewed in the cold analysis of an appellate bench, would not receive unqualified approval is nevertheless
condoned.
Disrespect towards the court is perhaps the most serious type of misconduct. Judges are quite rigid in their reaction to conduct which
threatens the dignity of the court.'6 The character of the judge is
beyond the bounds of proper comment.' 7 Personal epithets, slurs, 8
intimations of bias or prejudice, 9 charges of incompetence,20 or derogatory aspersions of any kind are not tolerated. Conduct disrupting the
decorum of the courtroom, such as shouting or yelling, is improper. 21
It is imperative that counsel refrain from arguing with the22court as
such behavior manifests disrespect for the judge's authority.
13 See Professional Canon 18, A.B.A. CAxoxs 15.
14See Professional Canon 23, A.BA. CA oNs 17.
15 See Professional Canon 15, A.B.A. CANo~s 13. 'roper" conduct may therefore be characterized as a scrupulous adherence to the letter and spirit of the
canons and to the customs and etiquette of the profession. However, to define
"improper" conduct as merely that conduct which falls below such standards is

an oversimplification. Any violation of the canons, even in spirit, is, in a strictly
ethical sense, "improper" as opposed to "proper" conduct. But our main concern is to examine "improper" conduct as a notion to connote that conduct for
which the attorney becomes subject to sanction. In this sense the terms "permissible" and "impermissible" may be more apposite. However, once expressed
and considered, the distinction may be forgotten, as such precision is neither
necessary nor desirable. The line between "improper" and "impermissible" conduct is vague and overlapping and is seldom enunciated. See Felix v. Hall-Brooke
Sanitarium, 140 Conn. 496, 101 A.2d 496 (1953). The courts do not usually concern
themselves with such niceties, but rather, while attending the business of deciding cases, confine their attentions to the practical issue of whether the conduct
in question is "sanctionable" or not, and it is in this context that the word
"improper" will be used.
16 See Love v. United States, 138 A.2d 666 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).
z7 See State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67,115 So. 370 (1927) (trial judge objected to assertion of his lack of legal knowledge); People v. Kimbrough, 193 Mich. 330,
159 N.W. 533 (1916) (intimation that judge was not fair in his rulings).
'8 See State v. Seminary, note 17 supra.
'19 See People v. Kimbrough, 193 lich. 330, 159 N.W. 533 (1916); Harris v. State,
47 Miss. 318 (1872); State v. Elder, 130 Wash. 612, 228 Pac. 1016 (1924).
20See State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 115 So. 370 (1927); State v. Whitworth, 126
Mo. 573, 29 S.W. 595 (1895).
21 See Hughes v. State, 103 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958); Waukegan Park Dist.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 IM.2d 238, 174 N.E.2d 824 (1961).
22See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949), 34 IowA L. REv. 673; Hickambottom v.
Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 479, 9 Cal. Rptr. 276 (2d Dist. 1960).
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Obstructing the orderly progress of trial is also improper. Such
tactics as interposing frivolous objections, 3 or attempting to proceed
in a manner previously barred by the court,24 such as repeated attempts to introduce evidence already ruled inadmissible, are grounds
25 deliberfor reprimand. Punctuality for sessions
26 of court is essential;
ate stalling or delay is reprehensible.

The conduct of attorneys in their relations with each other is also
subject to scrutiny and discipline by the court. While such relations
ought to be conducted with courtesy and consideration, the rules of
rectitude do not require counsel to coddle the rights of his opponent.27
He is free to employ all the forensic arts and wiles of the advocate.
It must always be remembered that clients, not lawyers, are the
litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it
counsel in their conduct and deshould not be allowed to influence
meanor toward each other.?8 Therefore opposing counsel should never
engage in personal opprobriums. 9 Although considerable latitude is
allowed for legitimate criticism, attacks on opponent's trial tactics or
ability are not condoned. 0 Bare allegations such as implying counsel
has intentionally suppressed evidence are highly improper unless
supported by facts.2 1 Constant bickering between counsel and the
"baiting" of opponents create a hostile atmosphere which
32 often permeates the entire trial and are to be sedulously avoided.
23

See Corn v. French, 74 Nev. 329, 331 P.2d 850 (1958); Dallas Ry. & Terminal
Co. v. Bishop, 203 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Tsx. R. Civ. P. 269 (g): "The
court shall protect counsel from any unnecessary interruption made on frivolous
and unimportant grounds."
24See Hickambottom v. Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 479, 9 Cal. Rptr.
276 (2d Dist. 1960) (continued to argue "last clear chance" doctrine to the jury);
Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Iowa 1216, 65 N.W.2d 157 (1954) (attempted to introduce
evidence previously excluded). In Swonger v. Celentano, 17 Wis. 2d 303, 116
N.W.2d 117 (1962), after the court sustained an objection, the attorney told the
witness that they would still get the testimony admitted. The resulting reprimand by the trial judge was approved on appeal.
2 See Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
20See Jardine Estates, Inc. v. Koppel, 24 N.J. 536, 133 A.2d 1 (1957) (party
falsely contended he was physically unable to continue trial).
27See People v. Vollmer, 274 App. Div. 1011, 85 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dept. 1948).
Following a long and tense murder trial, the district attorney made several indecorous statements in his summation to the jury. The court upheld the conviction
concluding that the jury's verdict was uninfluenced by the untoward remarks
and that the defendant had had a fair trial.
28See Professional Canon 17, A.B.A. CANONS 14.
20See Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Stewart, 164 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1947)
(counsel told jury opposing counsel "had tried everything except the facts").
30 See People v. Burnett, 190 N.E.2d 338 (IlM. 1963) (said opponent's tactics were
a smoke screen to fool the jury); Manteuffel v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 238
Minn. 140, 56 N.W.2d 310 (1952) (likened opposing counsel to Merlin the magician
trying to pull legal rabbit out of hat).
31 See Missouri-K.-T. R.R. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951).
32 See New York Cent. R.R. v. Milhiser, 231 Ind. 180, 106 N.E.2d 453 (1952);
cf. State v. Lorts, 269 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. 1954); State v. Tiedt, 360 Mo. 594, 229 S.W.2d
582, 588 (1950).
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Objectionable conduct is perhaps most prevalent during argument

to the jury, at least as indicated by the frequency with which it appears
in the appellate reports. However, in light of the devotion and zeal
with which the advocate often turns in the performance of his classical
momentary lapses
role of persuasion, this is understandable. Although
caused by the heat of trial are often excusable, 33 such lapses are not
to be condoned. As a general rule, counsel is limited in argument to
the evidence admitted at trial and any reasonable inference therefrom.3 4 Remarks that are made for the purpose of arousing the sym-

pathy or passion of the jury, such as reference to the wealth of a
party,35 are prohibited. Similarly, appeals to racial prejudice are condemned.3 6 Inflamatory words in themselves are not objectionable if
they are a proper inference from the evidence; however, mere epithets
are not permitted. Accordingly, reference to the defendant in a rape
prosecution as being "animalistic" was held to be acceptable as within

the scope of reasonable inference.3 7

Likewise, references to an ac-

cused as "lowdown, degenerate and filthy," 38 and as a "pimp,"39 a "mad
dog, ' 40 and an "ex-convict and a rattlesnake' '4" have all been held permissible inferences. Even slang expressions have been found proper;
for example, referring to an opponent's testimony as a "cock and bull
story" 2 when contradicted by other evidence. By the same token, it
is highly improper for an attorney to attempt to get facts before the
33 See Dean v. Trembley, 185 Pa. Super. 50, 57, 137 A.2d 880, 885 (1958) (dictum).

The court noted that such lapses are excusable in the eyes of the jurors and the
court and are usually attributed to the zealousness of counsel in behalf of their

client
and their cause.
34

See People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958)

(called defendant

"strange breed" of "kidnappers, robbers and forcible rapists"); People v. Elder,
25 M1I.2d 612, 186 N.E.2d 27 (1962) (referred to defendant in rape prosecution

as being "animalistic"); Brown v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 306, 220 S.W.2d 870.
(1949) (argued decedent lost life protecting children from moonshiners and bootleggers).
35
See Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So. 2d 308
(1959) (reference to defendant as wealthy corporation improper); Robinson v.
Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318 (1956) (comment to jury that corporate defendant ought to "feel" verdict improper); Graham v. Morris, 366 S.W.2d 792
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (argument farmer had as much right on highway as big-

gest trucking company improper); Smith v. Riedinger, 95 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1959)
(reference to defendant as a rich man improper).
36 See Emerson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 323, 82 S.E.2d 882 (1954) (argument Negroes
should be given severe sentences improper); Daylight Grocery Co. v. Jackson,
158 Fla. 314, 28 So. 2d 871 (1947) (argument injecting race prejudice improper).
37 See People v. Elder, 25 M. 2d 612, 186 N.E.2d 27 (1962).
38 See Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 226 P.2d 989 (1951). The court concurred emphatically in the prosecutor's description of the defendant who, according to the evidence, had raped a small girl while afflicted with gonorrhea.
39 See State v. Armstead, 283 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1955) (substantial evidence that
defendant was a panderer).
40See Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338 (1955).
41See Commonwealth v. Narr, 173 Pa. Super. 148, 96 A2d 155 (1953).
42See People v. Sinclair, 190 N.E.2d 298 (M11.
1963) (proper where inference
from evidence that testimony false).
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jury in argument which are inadmissible in evidence, such as a
criminal defendant's prior convictions. 43 Deliberate violation of the
rules of evidence, for instance, comment upon the failure of an accused to testify in his own behalf, is likewise improper.44 Finally, it is
improper for counsel to express his own personal belief
or opinion as
45
to his client's innocence or to the justice of his cause.
B. Sanctions
Primary responsibility for the discipline and control of counsel's
conduct rests with the trial court. 6 In carrying out this duty the
judge is given wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion.4 7 He not
only may but he has an affirmative obligation to take corrective
action in the case of misconduct. 4 Disciplinary measures in the sense
of informal sanctions cover a broad range, and the judge must apply
the punishment he feels is commensurate with the offense. The least
severe form of sanction is the reprimand. Misconduct of a more serious
nature will result in contempt proceedings. Both reprimand and contempt may be employed in varying degrees of severity. Appellate
courts are reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the trial court
in the discipline of errant attorneys; 49 generally they will not reverse
a judge except in the case of a manifest abuse of discretion.5 0 However,
it is within the authority of higher courts to censure the misconduct
of counsel, either in addition to the admonitions of the
trial court 51
52
or in the first instance when circumstances so require.
43See People v. Lyons, 47 Cal. 2d 303, 300 P.2d 329 (1956) (improperly referred
to defendant's prior conviction); People v. Ford, 89 Cal. App. 2d 467, 200 P.2d 867
(2d Dist. 1948) (repeated prejudicial statements of facts not in evidence held
flagrant misconduct).
44People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal. 2d 679, 284 P.2d 481 (1955). However, some jurisdictions allow comment upon the accused's failure to testify. See LADD, EVIDENCE
278-86 (2d ed. 1955).
45 See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382 (1897) (prosecutor's comment
that no immigrant could enter without paying off defendant was improper);
People v. Hoffman, 399 Ill. 57, 77 N.E.2d 195 (1948) (improper for prosecutor to
express personal belief of defendant's guilt). But see People v. Acuff, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 551, 211 P.2d 17 (1949) (prosecutor's comment he was satisfied defendant
guilty
held proper inference from evidence).
40
See Hickambottom v. Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 479, 9 Cal. Rptr.
276 (2d Dist. 1960); Waukegan Park Dist. v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 IIl. 2d 238, 174
N.E.2d
824 (1961).
47
See New York Cent. R.R. v. Milhiser, 231 Ind. 180, 106 N.E.2d 453 (1952);
Dean
v. Trembley, 185 Pa. Super. 50, 137 A.2d 880 (1958).
48
See Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924); Waukegan Park Dist. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 22 11. 2d 238, 174 N.E.2d 824 (1961).
45 See State v. Case, 247 Iowa 1019, 1030, 75 N.W.2d 233, 240 (1956) (dictum).
GO
See State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1285, 71 N.W.2d 35, 42 (1955); Dean v.
Trembley, 185 Pa. Super. 50, 137 A.2d 880 (1958).
51 See People v. Ford, 89 Cal. App. 2d 467, 200 P.2d 867 (2d Dist. 1948).
52
See Whitney v. Whitney, 15 I1. App. 2d 425, 146 N.W.2d 800 (1957); Neff v.
City of Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, 111 S.W. 1139 (1908); McGill v. State, 269 S.W.2d
398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954).
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1. Reprimand
The reprimand or censure is the most common informal sanction
available to the trial court to rebuke counsel's misconduct. Generally,
it is accomplished by merely pointing out the impropriety of counsel's
53
conduct or remarks and an admonition not to let it happen again.
The severity of the reprimand should be commensurate with the nature
of the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence. The nature
and use of the reprimand rests entirely with the discretion of the
judge.5 4 No precise form or exact language need be used. For example, the judge may simply say, "[T] hat remark was entirely uncalled for and as a member of the bar it should not have been made."55
However, the court should limit his remarks to counsel's misconduct
in the case at bar and should not rebuke counsel for misconduct which
occurred in previous trials.5 6
There is a split of authority as to whether or not it is proper for the
court to reprimand an attorney in the presence of the jury." Although
reprimand in open court may have a detrimental effect on counsel's
case, it would seem warranted in upholding the public's respect for
the courts, especially where the dignity of the court is involved.
All too frequently, reprimands go ignored by recalcitrant attorneys.
The regrettable weakness of the informal censure is that it relies on
counsel's solicitude for his professional reputation for its effectiveness.
Unfortunately, this reliance is not always well-founded. For example,
in Eizerman v. Behn,55 the court cited two previous instances in which
53
In Ganter v. Ganter, 39 Cal. 2d 272, 279, 246 P.2d 923, 928 (1952), upon refusing to allow counsel to ask a question, the judge commented, "I am running
the court and you are going to mind the judge."
54 See Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924); Dean v. Trembley, 185 Pa.
Super. 50, 137 A.2d 880 (1958).
5 Felix v. Hall-Brooke Sanitarium, 140 Conn, 496, 503, 101 A.2d 500, 503 (1953).
In Swonger v. Celentano, 17 Wis. 2d 303, 304, 116 N.W.2d 117, 119 (1962), counsel's
comment that he would still be able to get into evidence certain testimony which
had previously been excluded by the court drew the following rebuke from the
trial judge: 'Don't make any more statements like that. I am warning you on
that."
56 See Roy v. United Elec. R.R., 52 R.I. 173, 180, 159 Atl. 637, 640 (1932). The
court's remark that "other members of this court as well as myself have stood
[counsel's] petulance shown in these cases as long as we can" held reversible
error. (Emphasis added.)
57 The minority view considers it improper for the trial judge to discipline
counsel in the presence of the jury. See Whittenburg v. State, 46 Okla. Crim.
380, 287 Pac. 1049 (1930); Bell v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 90, 92 S.W.2d 259 (1936).
Although both courts say the trial judge should have excused the jury before
reprimanding counsel, the court in Whittenburg held the error to be so prejudicial as to require reversal, while in Bell the error was not considered sufficient to merit reversal.
Under the majority view the court is free to discipline counsel in the presence
of the jury. See Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956) (small fine
imposed); Vaughn v. State, 263 Ala. 552, 183 So. 428 (1938) (discipline threatened);
State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 115 So. 370 (1927) (reprimand). However, in each
case it was also noted that the court's action was not prejudicial.
5s 9 IlM. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956).
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counsel had been castigated by appellate courts for similar misconduct
with no effect. 59 Even more reprehensible was the court's observation
in People v. Wilkes60 that despite repeated denunciation, prosecutors
flagrantly and deliberately continued to comment improperly on the
failure of criminal defendants to testify in their own behalf.6'1 It would
seem that in such instances the time had come for resort to more
drastic and effective sanctions.
Occasionally, an attorney will be reprimanded in an appellate court
opinion.6 2 Censure by an appellate court is usually rather stinging;6 3 for instance, in admonishing counsel for an improper reference
to his client's poverty the court said, "That such remarks were inproper is something which is known to the most inexperienced trial
lawyer. Counsel... is not inexperienced." 64 Unfortunately, the name
of the offender is usually not mentioned in the opinion.6
However, attorneys are not without recourse from unfounded criticism by appellate courts. Petition of Sterling6 was a petition praying
for exoneration fied by Sterling protesting an opinion by the Supreme
Court of Colorado in which he had been publicly censured by name
for improper conduct. A hearing was held which vindicated his actions, whereupon the court published a separate opinion recognizing
its previous error and clearing Sterling's name.67 Although no similar
case has been found, the procedure would seem to be a desirable
method of affording relief from unwarranted reprimand.
2. Contempt
The power to punish contempts is an ancient and inherent prerogative of all courts.6 8 Contempts are of two kinds, constructive and
59 Id.at 285-87, 132 N.E.2d at 798-99.
00 44 Cal. 2d 679, 284 P.2d 481 (1955).
61 Id. at 687-88, 284 P.2d at 486.
62 See Whitney v. Whitney, 15 IM. App. 2d 425, 146 N.E.2d 800 (1957); Neff v.
City of Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, 111 S.W. 1139 (1908); McGill v. State, 269 S.W.2d
398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954).
63
In Zaulich v. Thompkins Square Holding Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 492, 200
N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dept. 1960), the court said that counsel were indeed fortunate
that the trial court was indulgent enough to limit his disapproval of their conduct
to a mere reprimand. In People v. Steinhardt, 9 N.Y.2d 267, 213 N.Y.S.2d 434
(1961), the appellate court reversed a conviction noting that the trial court
was mild in his reproofs and the jury may thereby have gotten the impression
the prosecution's prejudicial tactics were necessary and proper.
that
64
Eizerman v. Behn, 9 IlM. App. 2d 263, 285, 132 NXE.2d 788, 798 (1956).
65 Occasionally the court mentions the name of the errant counsel. See Hickambottom v. Cooper Transp. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 479, 9 Cal. Rptr. 276 (2d Dist. 1960);
Whitney v. Whitney, 15 IM. App. 2d 425, 146 NME.2d 800 (1957).
60 134 Colo. 211, 301 P.2d 346 (1956).
67 Id. at 211-12, 301 P.2d at 346-47. Sterling was censured in Blackwell v.
Midland Say. & Loan Ass'n, 132 Colo. 45, 284 P.2d 1060 (1955), for supposedly
withdrawing as counsel without notifying his client. Although the alleged misconduct did not occur in the courtroom, the instant method of vindication could
still have been used if it had.
68 See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888); Flannagan v. Jepson, 177 Iowa
393, 158 N.W. 641 (1916); State v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927). "The
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direct. Constructive contempts are those occurring outside the
presence of the court and will not be considered further. 69 Direct contempts, on the other hand, are those committed in the presence of the
court7 0 and the contempt proceeding is summary in nature; 71 that is,
the judge has the authority to dispose of the matter on the spot. He is,
in effect, accuser, prosecutor, and judge at the same time. However,
this procedure has been held to satisfy the requirements of due
process.7 2 Today, many states define contempt by statute.7 3 Also, contempt orders are now usually subject to appellate review,7 4 and most

power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the
judgments, orders and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice." Ex parte Terry, supra at 303.
69 Disobedience or an unlawful interference with any lawful judgment, order,
or process of the court is a constructive contempt; so too, are utterances and
publications outside the presence of the court. See Mnm.STAT. § 588.01(3) (1961).
Before punishing for constructive contempt the offender must be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. A rule or order to show cause against the
contempt is often employed. See IoWA CODE § 665.7 (1962).
70
Direct contempts are those occurring in the immediate view and presence
of the court, and arise from one or more of the following acts:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other
judicial proceedings;
(2) a breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance,
tending to interrupt the business of the court. Mhu. STAT. § 588.01(2)
(1961).
71See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952); State v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis.
1, 72 N.W. 193 (1897); Mun. STAT. § 588.03 (1961); Nelles, The Summary Power
to Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLu1n. L. REv. 956 (1931).
72 See In re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257, 275 (1948); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
73 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ch. 665 (1962); Mng. STAT. ch. 588 (1961); TEN. CODE
ANN. § 23-900-07 (1955).
74At common law, a court of competent jurisdiction was the sole judge of
contempts against its own authority and dignity, and its judgment in such cases
was final and conclusive and not reviewable. Many jurisdictions by constitutional or statutory provisions now authorize a review. See 20 IowA L. REV.
121 (1934). In the federal courts review is by appeal, see Wilson v. Byron
Jackson Co., 93 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1937), while in most states the procedure
for review is statutory, see, e.g., IowA CODE § 665.11 (1962) (writ of certiorari);
MAss. GEN. LAws AwN. ch. 250 § 9 (1956) (writ of error); TEx. CODE Canx.
PRoc. art. 113 (1948) (writ of habeas corpus). The distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is well explained in State v. Wingo, 221 Miss. 542, 547, 73
So. 2d 107, 109 (1954):
Contempt proceedings are generally regarded as being of two classes:
Those brought to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court; and
those brought to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties. The
procedure in the classes differs. The former are, as a rule, held criminal
in their nature and are generally governed by the rules applicable to
criminal cases. They are treated as independent actions. The latter
are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature and part of the
action in which they arise.
In Iowa, the distinction has been dropped from the statutes, see IOWA CODE
ch. 665 (1962), and the court has held that contempt proceedings under the
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jurisdictions require that a judgment of direct contempt recite
specific75
ally the evidentiary facts constituting the alleged offense.
Contempt should be used against an attorney in the manner which
would least tend to prejudice the jury against his client's case. Thus,
in Sacher v. United States,70 rather than entering contempt citations
against defense counsel during the trial, Judge Medina reserved the
right to punish them for contempt at the close of the trial.7 7 It was
his opinion that immediate action would inevitably have broken up
the trial and would have lessened the chances of a well-considered
judgment, thereby serving defendant's ends by a mistrial.78
A judgment of direct contempt is precipitated by more serious misconduct than that which results in a reprimand. Correspondingly,
punishment of7 a9 contempt is more severe; both fine and imprisonment
are authorized.

Contemptuous conduct cannot be precisely delineated.80 It is generally said that a contempt is an offense against the dignity or authority of the court."' Sometimes contempt is expressed as the failure to
conduct one's self with decorum and in a respectful manner.8 2 Howstatute are neither civil nor criminal but rather are "quasi-criminal." See
Sawyer v. Hutchinson, 149 Iowa 93, 127 N.W. 1089 (1910).
7 See Scott v. Davis, 328 S.W.2d 394 (Mlo. Ct. App. 1959). A contempt order
must set forth the actual facts as they transpired, not merely the conclusions of
the sentencing judge, to enable a supervisory court to review the contempt.
70 343 U.S. 1 (1952). For a bitter criticism, see MAIo, TnE COLm=sT TRAm
(2d ed. 1950).
77 343 U.S. at 7.
78See United States v. Sacher, 9 F-R.D. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The Supreme
Court approved Judge Medina's reasoning. In a five-to-four decision interpreting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), it was held that the word "summarily" referred to the nature of the contempt proceeding and was not intended
as a limitation on the time at which the contempt could be ordered. Sacher v.
United States, supra note 76, at 11.
7 Most statutes provide for two types of punishment: indefinite imprisonment
to coerce the performance of affirmative acts ordered by the court and within the
power of the person to perform, see, e.g., IowA CODE § 665.5 (1962); ynaDr. STAT.
§ 558.12 (1961); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-904 (1955); fine and/or imprisonment for a
definite period for acts which, being done, are completed contempts, see, e.g., IowA
CODE § 665.4 (1962); MVnm.STAT. § 558.10 (1961); TENw. CODE ANN. § 23-903
(1955). The available punishment for completed contempts in Iowa is dependent
upon the court in which it occurs. In the supreme court a fine not in excess of
one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than six months in the
county jail, or both fine and imprisonment, are available. In all other courts of
record, the maximum fine is reduced to five hundred dollars, but the maximum
length of imprisonment remains unchanged. However, only a fine which does
not exceed ten dollars is available in all other inferior courts. See IowA CODE §
665.4
(1962).
80
See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempts, 31 COLum. L. R v.
956, 957 (1931). See generally Note, 6 N.Y.U. IxRlA. L. Rsv. 222 (1951).
81 See Note, 20 IowA L. REv. 121, 124 (1934).
82
See Platuauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463, 163 Pac. 237 (3d Dist. 1917).
In § 665.2 of the Iowa Code, contempt is partially defined as:
1. Contemptuous or insolent behavior toward such court while engaged
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ever, these generalizations are not very helpful in defining the limits
83
of contemptuous conduct. Deceiving the court with false statements
4
and failing to cease improper questioning have been held contemptuous. The use of obscene words is a contempt 5 However, mistaken
acts of counsel, made in good faith, will not be held contemptuous.,6
Likewise, an attorney's assertion of his legal rights, or those of his
87
client, such as the right of counsel to stand while examining a witness
8
or the right of an accused to counsel of his own choice, have been
held not to be contempts, even when insisted upon by counsel in the
face of contrary orders of the judge. It would seem that intent, in the
sense that the improper act be willful, is a necessary element of
contempt.8 9 However, the willful nature of the act alone is not
sufficient to make the misconduct contemptuous. For example, improper argument ° to the jury and use of derogatory language,,"

although sufficient grounds for contempt, are often dismissed with a
mere reprimand.

Thus, other factors besides willfullness are often

determinative.
in the discharge of a judicial duty which may tend to impair the respect
due to its authority.
2. Any willful disturbance calculated to interrupt the due course of its
official proceedings.
83 See Albano v. Commonwealth, 315 Mass. 531, 53 N.E.2d 690 (1944) (intentional misrepresentation of fact by attorney to judge in open court); Butterfield
v. State, 144 Neb. 388, 13 N.W.2d 572 (1943) (counsel substituted page on file
without leave and later denied it); In re Estate of La Penta, 167 Ohio St. 536,
150 N.E.2d 404 (1958) (counsel misrepresented fees in probate report).
84See Glasgow v. State, 328 P.2d 185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); McEntire v.
Baygent, 229 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
85See Olimpus v. Butler, 248 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Anonymous, 21 Fed. 761 (W.D. Tenn. 1884).
86 See Sprinkle v. Davis, 111 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1940) (actions taken under a
mistaken view of the law); Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 359 P.2d
274 (1961) (objecting to counsel's comments counsel mistakenly thought improper).
S7 See Curran v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 258, 236 Pac. 975 (1920); Ex parte
Crenshaw, 96 Tex. Crim. 657, 259 S.W. 587 (1924). But see Creekmore v. United
States, 237 Fed. 743 (8th Cir. 1916).
s8 See Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463, 163 Pac. 237 (1917).
89 See IowA CODE § 665.2 (2) (1962), set forth at note 82 supra.
9
0 Contempt. See Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950); Taplin
v. Stanley, 102 Vt. 398, 148 Ati. 750 (1930). Reprimand. See Emerson v. State, 90
Ga. App. 323, 82 S.E.2d 882 (1954); Williams v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 307, 199 Pac.
400 (1921).
91 Contempt. See MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951)
(expressed opinion that judge should be ashamed of himself); Harding v.
McCollough, 236 Iowa 556, 19 N.W.2d 613 (1945) (accused court of ulterior motive
in refusing client bail); State v. Johnson, 171 Wash. 466, 18 P.2d 35 (1933)
(referred to witness as "scab"). Reprimand. See Freedman v. Willeford, 121
Cal. App. 2d 145, 262 P.2d 642 (4th Dist. 1953) (called witness "the kind of man
that a few dollars will influence"); People v. Kimbrough, 193 Mich. 330, 159
N.W. 533 (1916) (intimation that judge was not fair in his ruling); Manteuffel
v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 238 Minn. 140, 56 N.W.2d 310 (1952) (likened
opposing counsel to Merlin the magician trying to pull legal rabbit out of hat).
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An important factor seems to be the persistence of counsel in continuing his improper behavior in spite of repeated admonitions by the
court to desist. For instance, counsel's insistence upon an improper
line of questioning in the examination of a witness 92 and his refusal
to break off an indecorous colloquy03 with the court have resulted in
contempt.
Perhaps the most important factors in defining the line between
that conduct which is merely improper and that which is contemptuous
are those intangibles such as tone of voice, manner, bearing, and attitude. Where these factors convey an impression of insolence or
disrespect, counsel is held in contempt. Only the trial judge is in a
position to pass upon the effect of those factors and appellate courts
are extremely reluctant to overrule his judgment.9 4 Obviously, the
printed page is an inadequate record. However, for the same reason
it is impossible to assess the validity of this conclusion.
As the right of appeal from a direct contempt order may be inadequate, attorneys have occasionally resorted to the equitable common-law writ of prohibition for relief. Superior courts have the inherent power to issue the extraordinary writ of prohibition to prohibit
an inferior court from proceeding outside its jurisdiction, or from exercising its jurisdiction erroneously so as to result in irreparable injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.95 Even where appeal will lie, it may be an inadequate remedy under some circumstances. 90
92
See Glasgow v. State, 328 P.2d 185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); McEntire v.
Baygent, 229 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
03See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949). The Supreme Court affirmed the
contempt order resulting from the following exchange of words which occurred
during attorney Fisher's opening argument to the jury:
"By the Court: I will declare a mistrial if you mess with me two minutes
and a half, and fine you besides.
"By ir. Fisher: That is all right. We take exception to the conduct of
the Court.
"By the Court: That is all right; I will fine you $25.00.
"By Mr. Fisher: If that will give you any satisfaction.
"By the Court: That is $50.00; that is $25.00 more. Mr. Sheriff come
get it. Pay the clerk $50.00
"By Mr. Fisher: You mean for trying to represent my client?
"By the Court: No, sir; for contempt of Court. Don't argue with me.
"By Mr. Fisher: I am making no effort to commit contempt, but merely
trying to represent the plaintiff and stating in the argument"By the Court: Don't tell me. Mr. Sheriff, take him out of the courtroom. Go on out of the courtroom. I fine you three days in jail.
"By Mr. Fisher: If that will give you any satisfaction; you know you
have all the advantage by you being on the bench.
"By the Court: That will be a hundred dollar fine and three days in
jail. Take him out. Id. at 158.
04 See Id. at 161; Albano v. Commonwealth, 315 Mass. 531, 53 N.E.2d 690 (1944).
DG
See Williams v. Howard, 270 Ky. 728, 110 S.W.2d 661 (1937). The writ of
prohibition is available in Iowa, for the writ of certiorari was judged not to be
an adequate remedy by the Supreme Court of Iowa in State ex rel. O'Connor v.
District Court, 219 Iowa 1165, 260 N.W. 73 (1935).
90 See Herr v. Humphrey, 277 Ky. 421, 126 S.W.2d 809 (1939); Hammond v.
District Court, 30 N.M. 130, 228 Pac. 758 (1924); Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279,
114 P.2d 213 (1941).
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A recent Florida decision illustrates the effective employment of
this device. In Scussel v. Kelly9 7 an attorney was cited for contempt
for his statements in an affidavit supporting a suggestion that the trial
judge disqualify himself in a pending case because of his personal
bias and prejudice against the attorney. However, the judge set the
hearing on the suggestion of disqualification for the day following
the contempt hearing. This placed the attorney in the embarrassing
position, in proceeding on the disqualification suggestion for his client,
of having to face on the prior day the contempt citations issued against
him. Confronted with this dilemma, the attorney sought a writ of
prohibition from the district court of appeals. A writ was issued prohibiting the judge from hearing the case, the court finding a reasonable
basis for the allegations contained in the suggestion of disqualification,
although it did not pass on the truth of the charges. The court also
issued a writ prohibiting the trial judge from proceeding further in
the contempt case, concluding that to allow the contempt to continue8
on the facts of this case would be to exceed the judge's jurisdiction.
3. Reversal--Quasi-Sanction
The misconduct of an attorney may also be objected to by opposing
counsel regardless of whether or not the trial court has taken any
action on his own intiative. The sole basis for such an objection is
that the effect of the attorney's misconduct was such as to prejudice
opposing counsel or his client's cause in the eyes of the jury and not
the misconduct in and of itself.9 9 Objection must ordinarily be timely00
to enable the trial judge to mitigate the prejudicial effect of the misconduct by an instruction to the jury such as an admonition to disregard the improper remark in their deliberations and to base their verdict solely on the evidence. 01 However, if the misconduct is of such
pervasive prejudice that it can not be cured by an instruction the
judge must declare a mistrial.1 0 2 Appeal will lie without an objection
being raised only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or where the
prejudice could not have been cured by any action of the trial court. 10 3
If the objection is overruled, counsel may appeal on the issue of
whether the conduct was in fact prejudicial. 0 4 Even if the trial court
finds the conduct prejudicial and instructs the jury to disregard it,
counsel may still urge a mistrial on appeal. 0 5 However, in either
97 152 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
98 Id. at 783.
99
See State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928); Aultman v. Dallas Ry.
& Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509, 260 S.W.2d 596 (1953).
100 See People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958); People v. Sinclair,
190 N.E.2d 298 (Il1. 1963); State v. Smith, 248 Iowa 603, 81 N.W.2d 657 (1957).
101 See Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956); Pilgeram v. Haas,
118 Mont. 431, 167 P.2d 339 (1946); State v. Reppert, 132 W. Va. 675, 52 SE.2d 820
(1949).
10 2 See People v. Moore, 9 Ill. 2d 224, 137 N.E.2d 246 (1956).
Los4 See People v. Albert, 182 Cal. App. 2d 729, 6 Cal. Rptr. 473 (2d Dist. 1960).
0
See State v. Armstead, 283 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1955); Aultman v. Dallas Ry. &
'
Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509, 260 S.W.2d 596 (1953).
105 See New York Cent. R.R. v. Milhiser, 231 Ind. 180, 106 N.E.2d 453 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 316 Pa. 129, 173 Atl. 653 (1934).
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case, the ruling of the trial judge will be given great weight by the
appellate court because of the inherent limitations of a cold written
record, especially as to such an elusive fact issue as prejudice. The
test to be applied is whether or not the misconduct was so prejudicial,
when considered in the light of all the circumstances and the evidence,
as to have adulterated the fairness of the trial.10°3 If so, but the jury was
properly instructed to disregard the misconduct, the issue becomes
whether the prejudicial effect was in fact vitiated by the curative
instruction. 0 7 Error on either issue will result in reversal and a new
trial. 08 Under these circumstances, reversal has a curious secondary
effect which may be termed a quasi-sanction.
Reversal is clearly not a primary sanction because its purpose is
not to discipline counsel for his misconduct. Rather, the sole intended
purpose of a reversal is to grant to the appellant a new trial because
of the error committed by the trial judge in his erroneous finding of
fact either that the misconduct of appellee's counsel did not prejudicially affect appellant's case or that the curative instruction sufficiently vitiated the prejudice. Nevertheless, the reversal results in
overturning a judgment favorable to appellee-the client of the attorney whose misconduct precipitated the reversal. Consequently,
the client is compelled to endure the unwelcome bother and expense of
a new trial. This in turn results in an unhappy client, a luxury most
attorneys can ill-afford. For the lawyer on a contingent-fee contract,
the expense of a new trial is as much an out-of-pocket loss as is a
disciplinary fine. It may also be noted that public prosecutors who
waste the taxpayer's money in securing convictions which are subsequently reversed as a result of their prejudicial misconduct often have
brief careers. Therefore, the possibility of an ensuing reversal necessarily tends to coerce proper conduct, and thus accomplishes, in the
end, the ultimate purpose of a primary sanction. Although fortuitous,
it is a happy result.
II. JUDGES
A. Conduct
The judiciary must constantly bear in mind its position of esteem in
our society and the tremendous influence that its opinions, conduct,
and remarks will have on the jury.10 Many times a mere remark from
the bench will have more effect upon the jurors than will the testimony given by witnesses who are under oath.110 The Canons of
S00ee People v. Vollmer, 274 App. Div. 1011, 85 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dept. 1948);
Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338 (1955).
107 See Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Dickson, 228 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1950).
s08
See Raucci v. Connelly, 340 IM.App. 280, 91 N.E.2d 735 (1950); State v.
Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928).
109 See La Chase v. Sanders, 142 Conn. 122, 111 A.2d 690 (1955); Commonwealth
v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 508, 123 Atl. 486, 487 (1924).
110 See Pickerell v. Griffith, 238 Iowa 1151, 1166, 29 N.W.2d 588, 596 (1947):
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that jurors hang tenaciously upon
remarks made by the court during the progress of the trial, and if, perchance, they are enabled to discover the views of the court regarding the
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Judicial Ethics require a judge's behavior to be impartial, patient,
and attentive,1 1 ' and he should strive to live up to these precepts.
In order for a judge's conduct to be reviewed by an appellate court,
2
counsel must object to the conduct at the time it occurs" or objection
will be deemed waived unless the misconduct is of such prejudicial
3
Upon objection
nature as to deprive the party of essential justice.
the judge himself will often attempt to vitiate the prejudicial effect by
4
instructing the jury to disregard his remarks or actions." However,
where the prejudicial effect can not be cured by an instruction to the
jury, the judge must declare a mistrial or the resultant verdict will
have to be reversed."15
Derogatory remarks constitute perhaps the most prevalent breach of
judicial decorum. Prejudicial remarks which belittle either the sub1
ject matter or the importance of the litigation,"6 or the merits of the
defense, "7 are improper. For example, in Myers v. Georgen" a case
involving professional wrestling, the trial judge referred to the spec9
He also asked
tators who attend wrestling shows as "suckers.""
a witness from the bench how he promoted professional wrestling and
kept his religion. In reversing the case the appellate court said 1that
0
the judge's remarks "tended to make a mockery out of the trial."
Moreover, a judge must refrain from making remarks which tend
2
to discredit one of the parties.' ' Remarks which intimate that one
of the litigants has engaged in tortious conduct or in a crime are imeffect of a witness' testimony, or the merits of the case, they almost invariably follow them.
" See Judicial Canon 5, A.B.A. CANONS 52.
"'2 See Crooks v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 113, 268 P.2d 203 (1st
Dist. 1954).
"13 See Curd v. Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, Inc. 213 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1954)
(dictum).
4
1 See Richman v. San Francisco, N. & C. Ry., 180 Cal. 454, 181 Pac. 769 (1919);
Herndon v. City of Springfield, 137 Mo. App. 513, 119 S.W. 467 (1909).
"5 See Rabinowitz v. Lipschitz, 127 N.Y. Supp. 486 (Sup. Ct. 1911) (obvious
disbelief of witness' testimony); Morris v. Kramer Bros. Co., 182 N.C. 87, 108 SE.
381 (1921) (criticism of ethics of attorney called as witness).
'16 See La Chase v. Sanders, 142 Conn. 122, 111 A.2d 690 (1955) (importance of
litigation); Clark v. Variety, Inc., 189 App. Div. 462, 178 N.Y. Supp. 698 (1st
Dept. 1919) (importance of subject matter).
"7 See Maull v. Carbess Realty, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 588, 208 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct.
1960) (evinced hostility toward position of defendants); Thompson v. Angel, 214
N.C. 3, 197 SM. 618 (1938) (remarked that law upon which defense predicated
was a bad law); Hambleton v. Selden, 163 Pa. Super. 259, 60 A.2d 369 (1948)
(facetious comment belittling defense).
"s 271 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1959).
-9 Id. at 171.
120 Id. at 174.
121 See Laney v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1961) (remarked
defendant corporation corrected its records for purpose of trial); Mason v. United
States, 63 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1933) (prompted plaintiff's witnesses while hostile to
defendant's); Harms v. Simkin, 322 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (attempt to
aid layman acting as own counsel inadvertently prejudicial). See generally Note,
Off the Deep End: Bias from the Bench, 11 SaAcusE L. REv. 244 (1980).
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22
Under the majority view, the court should also abstain
proper.'
from indicating in any manner his personal views upon the credibility
of a witness'2 3 or upon the sufficiency of the evidence.124 So too, the
court must desist from directing disparaging remarks toward a
witness. 25 However, if the remarks have been provoked by the behavior of the witness while on the stand, the judge may be permitted
greater latitude. 126 Counsel must also be treated fairly by the judge,

and prejudicial remarks, other than for the purpose of discipline, are
improper.'127 It is not improper for the trial court to question a witness

from the bench for the purpose of clarifying or properly understanding

his testimony. 2s However, if the interruptions are of such frequency
or duration that they create an impression of judicial preference for
' 2 2 See Kuzemka v. Gregory, 109 Conn.117, 146 At. 17 (1929) (asked defendant
whether he knew of usury law); Davison v. Herring, 24 App. Div. 402, 48 N.Y.
Supp. 760 (4th Dept. 1897) (remarked in civil case that it should be taken before
grand jury).
123 See Bloom v. Hopman, 173 Pa. Super. 292, 98 A.2d 414 (1953) (hoped jury
was not foolish enough to follow witness' reasoning); Stoffel v. Metcalf Const.
Co. 145 Neb. 450, 17 N.W.2d 3 (1945) (said witness' testimony was far afield and
hearsay); Dye v. Rathbone, 102 W. Va. 396, 135 S.E. 274 (1926) (asked witness if
he was sure that was what defendant had said).
124 See Harms v. Simkin, 322 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); State v. Bogner,
382 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1963). However, unlike the majority view, the trial judge
in the federal courts is not a mere moderator. This was the rule at common law
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and is often referred to as the
English system. See Myers v. George, 271 F.2d 168, 173 (8th Cir. 1959). A federal
judge may comment upon either the credibility of a witness or the sufficiency of
the evidence provided that he makes it perfectly clear to the jury that they are
not bound by the court's views but that they are the sole judges as to the facts.
See Northcraft v. United States, 271 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1959); Cook v. United
States, 18 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1927).
125 See Podlasky v. Price, 87 Cal. 2d 151, 196 P.2d 608, 616-18 (2d Dist. 1948)
(told witness, "Just pretend you have a brain now. Just play you have."); Brown
v. Frederick Loeser & Co., 244 App. Div. 819, 280 N.Y. Supp. 115 (2d Dept. 1935)
(characterized witness' act as pure and simple larceny); Crenshaw v. Southern
Ry., 214 S.C. 533, 53 S.E.2d 789 (1949) (claimed witness did not have sense enough
to understand English language).
126 In Bullock v. Sklar, 369 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), the trial court
had remarked that the witness, who was a lawyer, should not quibble, and should
answer the question propounded. The record disclosed that the witness had
exhibited a tendency to temporize or give inapposite answers. The appellate
court said that under the circumstances the trial court did not exceed the bounds
of judicial propriety.
27 See Lan Lee v. United States, 67 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1933); People v. Godsey, 334
IMI. 11, 165 N.E. 178 (1929); Eager v. StatB, 205 Tenn. 156, 325 S.W.2d 815 (1959)
(asked counsel "was he not taught that in his first year of law school").
228 See Morello v. Brookfield Const. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 849, 156 N.Y.S.2d 163
(1st Dept. 1956) (desired full and fair presentation of all issues); Andrews v.
Andrews, 243 N.C. 779, 92 S.E.2d 180 (1956) (to clarify and facilitate taking of
witness's testimony); Judicial Canon 15, A.B A. CANoNs 48-49.
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one side or 0the otheru9 or intimate the judge's disbelief of a witness's
testimony,1" whether intentionally or inadvertently, they are improper.
In addition to misconduct resulting from improper affirmative actions
of the judge, misconduct may result from his failure to heed established practices and procedures. Deliberate refusal of the court to
abide by applicable rules of civil procedure constitutes error.'3'
Likewise, it has been held improper for the judge to instruct the court
1 32
reporter to abstain from recording comments made from the bench.
Furthermore, failure of the judge to remain in33 the courtroom while
the trial is in progress has been held improper.
B. Sanctions
It is essential in trial courts that the judges who are appointed to
administer the law should be permitted to administer it independently
and freely and without fear of consequences. 3 4 Within the limits of
their functions, they possess powers which require the exercise of deliberation and judgment, and while so acting they are entitled to
broad discretion. Ultimate reliance must be on the sense of honor
and duty, the wisdom and self-restraint of each individual judge. 13
Unfortunately, as has been seen, all judges do not measure up to. the
high ideals of the bench. The sovereignty of the judge in his own
courtroom is subject to abuse. If a judge demeans his high office by
gross misconduct, he may be removed by impeachment. But for
judicial misconduct insufficient to warrant impeachment, judges are
accountable only indirectly. Informal sanctions, at least in the true
sense, do not exist.
129 See Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1937); People v. Raymond, 249 App. Div. 121, 291 N.Y. Supp. 198 (Ist Dept. 1936); State v. Lea, 130
S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1963).
130 See Andrews v. Andrews, 243 N.C. 779, 92 S.E2d 180 (1956).
131 See Thews v. Mliller, 121 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 1963).
332See
Roberts Elec., Inc. v. Foundations & Excavations, Inc., 5 N.J. 426, 75
A.2d 858 (1950).
133See Snodgrass v. Charleston Nugrape Co., 113 W. Va. 748, 169 S.E. 406 (1933);
Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Ore. 577, 598-602, 173 P.2d 596, 605-08 (1946); BoWNERs,
JumiciA DISCRETON or TaRi CouRTs § 242 (1931). In the Frangos case, with the
assent and stipulation of counsel, the judge retired to his chambers during opening
argument to the jury. However, the door to the courtroom remained open during
his absence and he was able to and did hear the arguments. Noting that such
absence during argument was general practice in certain counties, the supreme
court said the practice should be discontinued, and held it to be reversible error.
But see People v. Kimbrough, 193 Mich. 330, 159 N.W. 533 (1916), where the
judge's absence under similar circumstances was held to be not prejudicial and
therefore not reversible error.
134 Cf. Scott v. Stanfield, [1868] L.R. 3 Exch. 220, 223 (judges immune from
slander or libel while acting in judicial capacity).
This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest
it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences.
135 See Dawson, The Functions of the Judge, in TAixs o N AmDmcAw LAw 18, 28-

29 (Berman ed. 1961).
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If the improper conduct of the court is so prejudicial as to frustrate
the essential fairness of the trial, the decision will be reversed on
appeal. As in the case of an attorney's misconduct, the purpose of the
reversal itself is not to sanction the perpetrator of the mischief, although it does give expression to the impropriety. But unlike the attorney, the judge does not have even an indirect pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the litigation, and thus he is insulated from the quasisanction effect of the reversal. However, it is a well known fact that
most trial judges are very sensitive to appellate reversal and extremely jealous of their records. Therefore, the effect of the reversal
still tends to discourage improper conduct.
There is also a marked reluctance on the part of appellate courts to
accompany reversals for judicial misconduct with a reprimand in its
opinion. This reluctance reflects a legitimate and conscious desire on
the part of the judiciary to refrain from the open discipline of judges
because of its possible detrimental effect on the integrity of the courts
in the eyes of the public.36 Flagrant abuses may evoke only a seemingly innocuous response, but most judges are responsive to even the
slightest suggestion of their judicial superiors. A terse and 37simple
may
comment, such as "the judge's remarks were highly improper,'
thus be as telling to a judge's pride as a withering harangue.
Unfortunately, even in the few instances when reviewing courts
have felt constrained to criticize openly the actions of a judge, all too
often the censure has gone to no avail. For example, in Etzel v.
Rosenbloom,"3 ' the California Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision, cited four previous opinions in which the same judge's attention
had been directed to the impropriety of his conduct. He was again rewe may
buked although the court noted prophetically that "anything
say will have no effect on his future course of action."" 39 Only six
months later, in Podlasky v. Price, 40 the court was again forced to
reverse the decision for the prejudicial misconduct of the same judge,
the majority noting regretfully that previous reversals had still not
effected a reform in his behavior. In a concurring opinion, two justices
scathingly denounced the contumacious judge's irresponsible conduct
and urged that he be retired either by resolution of the state legislature
or upon1recommendation of the governor on the grounds of mental disability. I
The foregoing travesty of justice serves to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the appellate reprimand as a sanction for the misconduct of the
recalcitrant judge. Verbal censure depends on the sensitivity or
vulnerability of the judge for its effectiveness. Mere words accomplish
130

See Scussel v. Kelly, 152 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 1963):

It is regrettable that we must detail in this opinion allegations that we
would much prefer to delete because of the high position which Judge
Kelly occupies and the unnecessary and unwarranted reflection that a
case of this kind brings upon the entire judiciary and bar in the eyes of

the public.

See La Chase v. Sanders, 142 Conn. 122, 124-25, M11 A.2d 690, 692 (1955).
Cal. App. 2d 758, 189 P.2d 848 (2d Dist. 1948).
139 Id. at 764-65, 189 P.2d at 852.
140 87 Cal. App. 2d 151, 196 P.2d 608 (2d Dist. 1948).
'4' Id. at 169-71, 196 P.2d at 619-20 (concurring opinion).
137

138 83
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naught in trying to sear the conscience of the calloused judge, while
the autonomy of the bench renders his position impregnable to mere
142
criticism. Although the threat of impeachment is only a bluff at best,
in those jurisdictions in which judges are elected the concerted efforts
of the bar may be brought to bear against the recalcitrant judge's
re-election to office. 43
It would therefore appear as if some procedure were necessary by
which limited pressure could be brought to bear on a recalcitrant
judge.144 A procedure of this kind would necessarily require teeth
to be effective, and yet it should preferably be flexible enough to
facilitate the application of varying degrees of coercion.
At the present time only one state possesses a procedure similar to
that envisaged. 4 Pursuant to a constitutional mandate charging the
Michigan Supreme Court with general supervisory powers over the
state judiciary, 46 the Supreme Court Rules Concerning Superintendence of the Judiciary of Michigan17 were adopted in 1959 prescribing
the procedure for the discipline of judicial officers. In general the
rules provide that the chief justice shall, upon request or upon his own
initiative, cause to be investigated the misconduct of any court, in142 Between 1928-1948, only three judges were formally charged with impeach-

ment. Each was successful in his defense. See Miller, Discipline of Judges, 50
MIcH.
L. REv. 737 (1952).
143 The Iowa State Bar Association has recently approved a bar plebiscite.

Prior to election campaigns, local bar members will be secretly polled on the
question of whether the incumbent judge should be retained in office. If a judge
receives over fifty per cent approval, his re-election will be endorsed by the bar;
if over fifty per cent vote no his re-election will be opposed. See 23 News Bulletin of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 1-2 (No. 9, 1963). This innovation should be
effective
in forcing judges to be more responsive to the criticisms of the bar.
'144 Tn Brand, The Discipline of Judges, 46 A.B-A.J. 1315, 1316 (1960), the author
states that "the most urgent need is methods to deal with judicial conduct not
warranting or requiring removal." He goes on to say that the ultimate responsibility for disciplinary action should rest with the highest court of the state and
be clearly defined; that provision should be made for the initiation and investigation of complaints before presentment of formal charges; and that the hearings
should be private unless the judge under consideration requests otherwise. His
recommendations appear well considered.
2-415
However, the idea of reform in this area is not unique. Brand discusses the
various procedures which have been adopted in five other jurisdictions. Id. at
1316-17.
46
1 See MIcH. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 10 (1908).
The new constitution which is
to become effective Jan. 1, 1964, retains these provisions. MIcH. CONST. art VI, §§
4, 13 (1963). This provision is not peculiar to Michigan. See, e.g., COLO. CONST.
art. VI, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. V, § 4; Wis. CONsT. art. 7, § 3. There is a question
whether the power of supervision is limited to express constitutional grants or if
it is an inherent power which may be implied from general constitutional pro-

visions establishing the judicial departments of government. See collection of cases
in Annot. 112 A.L.R. 1351, 1352 (1938). At least one state has established a disciplinary procedure relying solely on bare judicial power. See OHIO SuP. CT. R.
XXVII, discussed in Brand, supra note 144, at 1317.
"47 SUp.
CT. R. CONCERNING SUPERINTENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY OF MiCH. 1-9.
The rules were adopted June 5, 1959, by a five-to-three vote of the supreme court.
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cluding personal practices of any judicial officer contrary to the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, previously adopted by the court, and any other
practices likely to expose the court or judge to public censure or reproach or that are prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
If the investigation produces reasonable cause to believe that the
judge is guilty of misconduct, the chief justice must direct a hearing
upon an order to show cause. If the charges are sustained, the court
in its discretion then determines the corrective and disciplinary measures to be taken, or, upon sufficient grounds, it may recommend to the
legislature or the governor that the judge be impeached.
In the only case reported to date involving the new procedure,
In re Graham, 48 the court briefly considered the disciplinary measures
which it might employ, although unanimously deciding that the conduct of Judge Graham was so "intolerable and unpardonable" 4 9 that
it was recommended he be impeached. The court noted, however, that
had it been merely a question of ethically questionable conduct, its
normal instinct would have been sympathetic, and had doubt existed,
it would have leaned toward application of the presumption of innocence and crass ignorance. In such instances, the court said, it would
have been inclined to order a judgment of censure and reprimand
only.10 One concurring justice would have gone further than the
majority and enjoined the judge from exercising the powers and
duties of his judicial office pending the legislative and executive action
recommendedY 5" This idea was considered by the majority but expressly rejected, the court saying the constitutional mandate included
no power to remove or impeach a judicial officer as that function belonged to the coordinate branches of government. 52 However, it is
interesting to note that on failure of the legislature to act, the court
subsequently, and without opinion, enjoined Judge Graham from exercising his powers and duties as a judge. 153 Thus, the extent of those
sanctions which may be or can be fashioned under this procedure is
still far from clear. It is felt that because of the formality of the procedure a judgment of censure and reprimand, as suggested by the
court, will be considerably more effective than a mere informal admonition since it would impress upon even a recalcitrant judge the
gravity of his offense.
This procedure apparently provides the intermediate sanction between reprimand and impeachment which is so vitally needed for the
adequate control of judicial misconduct. At the same time it retains
the requisite flexibility by leaving the punishment to the court's discretion. It would therefore seem that the device deserves a careful appraisal by other jurisdictions.
148

366 Mich. 268, 114 N.W.2d 333 (1962).

14 Id. at 275, 114 N.W.2d at 336.

150 Id. at 276, 114 N.W.2d at 336.
I Id. at 280, 114 N.W.2d at 338 (concurring opinion).
152 Id. at 278, 114 N.W.2d at 337. This is in accord with the position of other
courts. See State ex rel. Murray v. Bozarth, 167 Okla. 321, 29 P.2d 579 (1934).
153 See reporter's note, 366 Mich. at 280-81.

19641

NOTES
III.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the cases involving the misconduct of attorneys in the
courtroom leads to but one inevitable conclusion-it is impossible to
define in any precise or meaningful capacity the fine line between
proper and improper conduct. The line separating censurable from
contemptuous conduct is equally vague and there is a considerable
overlap. Probably the most important reason for this, and a valid
one, is that the responsibility for the discipline of attorneys rests
within the discretion of the trial courts rather than on any one set of
strict rules, and the standards of conduct thus vary from judge to
judge. The task of the scholar is made even more difficult because of
the inherent limitations of the cold record in portraying the many
intangible factors which are so vital to a clear understanding of the
subject. However, it may safely be said that conduct in conformity
with the Canons of Professional Ethics is well within the bounds of
propriety. Unfortunately, informal reprimands do not appear to be
very effective in curbing courtroom misconduct. Summary contempts
have considerably more effect. In this regard it is worthy of note that
on review of contempt orders appellate courts carefully scrutinize
the alleged misconduct and do not hesitate to reverse the order in cases
where counsel was acting within his rights or the misconduct was
prompted by the judge's arbitrariness.
The judiciary is held to a higher standard of conduct than the bar
and as a result the line between proper and improper conduct is more
crystallized. Judicial prerogatives are occasionally abused. However,
there are in fact few effective sanctions presently available to curtail
judicial misconduct. Michigan has pioneered the development of a
much needed intermediate disciplinary procedure, but it is still too
early to evaluate its success. The problems of reconciling judicial
independence and freedom with a meaningful sanction present many
conceptual as well as practical difficulties. However, the unimpeachable character of the judiciary must be constantly maintained if it is
to command the continued essential approval of the people. 4
15 4 See Preamble, Canons of Professional Ethics, A.B.A. CAxoNs 1, discussed note

5 supra.

